The Aspen accident seems to be a classic case of the get-theres. In this case the desire was that of the customer, but it nonetheless effected the pilots judgment. It was quite clear that the flight was headed down the wrong path from the beginning. The customers poor attitude set up a scenario where not reaching the destination became a failure of the flight. Were there a different attitude the flight would have most likely diverted to Rifle due to the weather. Despite the weather conditions and multiple reports of missed approached by similarly equipped aircraft, the crew initiated the VOR/DME-C which is a circling approach. This approach was notamed: circling NA at night, which due to the lack of a straight in made the whole approach invalid in the dark. Although it was not quite night yet, if the crew had not been under the pressure to arrive to the destination I feel that they may not have attempted it. Conditions continued to deteriorate after the approach was initiated, and the aircraft eventually wandered off of the approved approach procedure. In the dark they failed to find the runway, and impacted terrain short and to the right of centerline.
In my opinion there were several major factors in the crash.
1. The presure to complete the customers mission
2. The choice to fly an innapropriate approach for the conditions
3. The inclement weather conditions.
Despite the presence of multiple factors, this whole accident could have likely been prevent with a more safety conscious attitude from the beginning.
n968wcRangley
N968WC at NIFA Regionals 2007
Monday, September 27, 2010
Sunday, September 19, 2010
Alone in the Dark (Single Pilot IFR)
The question posed is would I fly single pilot IFR? The short of the answer is not right now. Am I current? Yes. Am I proficient? No. Thats the most basic reason I have for my current answer.
However, I have done it before and I must say that even flying an approach I had flown several times before became a sobering experience when I was alone the clouds. Coming Back from a flight to College Station, TX there was a forecast for a band of clouds that would move in from the south across the area, but was not forecast to effect my destination of Sugar land Regional Airport. When I departed, Sugar Land was still forecasting scattered clouds at 1000ft, a common occurrence in the area. But as with any flight forecast things were bound to change. Between the time I left College Station, and arrived over the Eagle Lake VOR a layer of clouds from about 700-1000agl to 2400ft had pushed north over my route, but it looked like sugar land was still beyond their edge. So I tuned up the awos only to find out unfortunately that was not the case. My next call was to Montgomery CO FSS to see if any of my usual alternates were going to work. The Informed me that The clouds were pushing to the north earlier than expected. I knew a diversion would most likely take me north to Brenham. So feeling confident fresh off my instrument rating and flying another G1000 equipped c172, I decided to file a pop-up for the Runway 35 ILS into Sugar Land. Charts in hand, I called the ever helpful Houston Approach and made my request, they gave me a squawk code and cleared me to fly the approach as published continuing inbound from the eagle lake VOR. Thinking ahead, I was already setup from the VOR, and had the approach briefed and in the gps. I ran the descent checklist and, reduced power and sank down into the clouds to 2200ft. 10 minutes, and a hand off to Sugar Land Tower, later I reached Hull NDB and a southbound turn. I had been monitoring the awos and the ceiling was varying from 700ft to 1000ft. A margin of at least 500 ft above minimums was a reassuring thought as I reached HULLO intersection and dropped another 200ft. I made the procedure turn, came down to 1800ft, and called Tower to report catching the glide-slope inbound. Just like every time before I kept scanning, kept the needles mostly pegged. Somewhere around 900ft I noticed the cockpit get brighter and looked up to see home at 12 o'clock. After an uneventful landing, I thought about my decisions, actions, and why everything went as smoothly as it did.
1. I was recently current, and very proficient. If It had been 3-4 months since my last approach I would have headed for Brenham and not even considered trying an approach.
2. I was familiar, and very comfortable with the airplane. I was flying the same setup I used for all my instrument training. If I was flying steam gauges, once again I would have made a different decision.
3. I was familiar with the area and the procedures. I had practiced every approach into Sugar Land multiple times, I knew what was coming, and I knew the missed approach procedures.
Those 3 things are my personal big issues when it comes to flying single pilot IFR, if any of them are in question I would not risk flying into the clouds alone.
As for the article, the most interesting thing I read was the section on the use of non-pilot's as a resource. Most of us see our front seat passengers as strangers in a strange land that we have to keep off the controls and away from the switches. However, it's apparent that in high workload scenarios that a passenger could become a huge asset for keeping track of charts and performing other low complexity tasks.
However, I have done it before and I must say that even flying an approach I had flown several times before became a sobering experience when I was alone the clouds. Coming Back from a flight to College Station, TX there was a forecast for a band of clouds that would move in from the south across the area, but was not forecast to effect my destination of Sugar land Regional Airport. When I departed, Sugar Land was still forecasting scattered clouds at 1000ft, a common occurrence in the area. But as with any flight forecast things were bound to change. Between the time I left College Station, and arrived over the Eagle Lake VOR a layer of clouds from about 700-1000agl to 2400ft had pushed north over my route, but it looked like sugar land was still beyond their edge. So I tuned up the awos only to find out unfortunately that was not the case. My next call was to Montgomery CO FSS to see if any of my usual alternates were going to work. The Informed me that The clouds were pushing to the north earlier than expected. I knew a diversion would most likely take me north to Brenham. So feeling confident fresh off my instrument rating and flying another G1000 equipped c172, I decided to file a pop-up for the Runway 35 ILS into Sugar Land. Charts in hand, I called the ever helpful Houston Approach and made my request, they gave me a squawk code and cleared me to fly the approach as published continuing inbound from the eagle lake VOR. Thinking ahead, I was already setup from the VOR, and had the approach briefed and in the gps. I ran the descent checklist and, reduced power and sank down into the clouds to 2200ft. 10 minutes, and a hand off to Sugar Land Tower, later I reached Hull NDB and a southbound turn. I had been monitoring the awos and the ceiling was varying from 700ft to 1000ft. A margin of at least 500 ft above minimums was a reassuring thought as I reached HULLO intersection and dropped another 200ft. I made the procedure turn, came down to 1800ft, and called Tower to report catching the glide-slope inbound. Just like every time before I kept scanning, kept the needles mostly pegged. Somewhere around 900ft I noticed the cockpit get brighter and looked up to see home at 12 o'clock. After an uneventful landing, I thought about my decisions, actions, and why everything went as smoothly as it did.
1. I was recently current, and very proficient. If It had been 3-4 months since my last approach I would have headed for Brenham and not even considered trying an approach.
2. I was familiar, and very comfortable with the airplane. I was flying the same setup I used for all my instrument training. If I was flying steam gauges, once again I would have made a different decision.
3. I was familiar with the area and the procedures. I had practiced every approach into Sugar Land multiple times, I knew what was coming, and I knew the missed approach procedures.
Those 3 things are my personal big issues when it comes to flying single pilot IFR, if any of them are in question I would not risk flying into the clouds alone.
As for the article, the most interesting thing I read was the section on the use of non-pilot's as a resource. Most of us see our front seat passengers as strangers in a strange land that we have to keep off the controls and away from the switches. However, it's apparent that in high workload scenarios that a passenger could become a huge asset for keeping track of charts and performing other low complexity tasks.
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
Where't the Fire (Blog Post #2)
After reading the article on electrical fires, I came away with important new piece of wisdom. I learned that the time to diagnose an electrical fire is long before it actually ignites. Being proactive and monitoring the electrical system could potentially prevent a small problem from growing into a major emergency. Something as simple as an unusually high electrical load, or a discrepancy with electrically powered equipment could indicate a major problem.
1. A short circuit occurs when electrical current flows back to the source along a path other than the one intended.
2. The Seminole's procedure basically follows what is outlined in the article, however it begins with the presence of a fire and does not outline procedures for detecting the problem before it escalates.
3. In the future I plan to be much more proactive in detecting an electrical problem before it becomes a fire. As with every problem in aviation, the best solution for an electrical fire is to prevent it in the first place.
1. A short circuit occurs when electrical current flows back to the source along a path other than the one intended.
2. The Seminole's procedure basically follows what is outlined in the article, however it begins with the presence of a fire and does not outline procedures for detecting the problem before it escalates.
3. In the future I plan to be much more proactive in detecting an electrical problem before it becomes a fire. As with every problem in aviation, the best solution for an electrical fire is to prevent it in the first place.
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